ADMIRALTY-DAMAGES-PUNITIVE

DAMAGES

NOT AVAILABLE

UNDER THE JONES AcT-Kopczynski v. TheJacqueline, 742 F.2d

555 (9th Cir. 1984).
Since its enactment in 1920, the Jones Act' has governed
cases of maritime personal injury. The statute provides remedies2
to seamen injured or killed in the course of their employment,
I "Jones Act" is the term commonly used to refer to § 33 of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-889 (1982). See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR.,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 327 (2d ed. 1975). The Jones Act states in part:

Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law,
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United
States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases
of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the
death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal
representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at
law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the
United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in
the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such
actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant
employer resides or in which his principal office is located.
46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1982) (original version at Merchant Marine Act, ch. 250, § 33,
41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920)). The Act was named after its sponsor, Washington Senator Wesley L.Jones. 2 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 30:3, at 328 n. 22 (4th ed.
1985).
Congress passed a considerable amount of legislation respecting the United
States Merchant Marine in the years immediately following World War I. In addition to the Merchant Marine Act, the following statutes were passed: the Suits in
Admiralty Act, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
§§ 741-752 (1982)) (governing arrest and seizure of vessels); the Death on the
High Seas Act, ch. 111, 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
§§ 761-768 (1982)) (governing death of any person outside United States waters);
and the Ship Mortgage Act, ch. 250, § 30, 41 Stat. 1000 (1920) (codified as
amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-984 (1982)) (governing sale, conveyance, and mortgage of United States vessels).

2 See 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1982). The Fifth Circuit has developed a threepronged test to determine whether an individual asserting seaman status under the
Jones Act is a proper claimant. See Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 775 (5th
Cir. 1959). First, the seaman must allege that he was employed upon a vessel in
navigation; second, the employee must have "a more or less permanent connection
with the vessel"; and third, the employee must "be aboard primarily to aid in navigation." Id.; see also Wilkes v. Mississippi River Sand & Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383,
388 (6th Cir. 1953) (applying same test); IB A. SANN, S. BELLMAN, B. CHASE, M.
CHYNSKY & R. MENSEL, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 1 la, at 2-5 (7th ed. 1984) (setting forth identical test) [hereinafter cited as IB BENEDICT]. This test has been
adopted by virtually every court that has been presented with the question of
whether an individual is a Jones Act seaman. See id. Thus, the determination
whether an individual is a seaman is a question of fact. See 2 M. NORRIS, supra note

1, § 30:8, at 352.
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but does not specifically define what damages may be recovered. 3
While the Jones Act incorporates by reference the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 4 that statute is also silent with respect to the type of damages that may be recovered. 5 Thus,
although injured seamen may recover compensatory or actual
damages under the Jones Act,6 the right of injured seamen to
recover punitive damages under the Act remains uncertain.7
3 See 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1982). For an exhaustive study of the rights of seamen
and maritime workers to recover for death and personal injury, see G. GILMORE &
C. BLACK, JR., supra note 1, at 272-484.
4 See 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1982); see also Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 208 (1955)
(Jones Act extends FELA rights to seamen).
5 See Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982). The FELA
grants a cause of action to any railroad employee who is injured while employed by
a common carrier in interstate or foreign commerce. Id. § 51. The statute provides
that contributory negligence will operate to reduce recoverable damages; however,
contributory negligence will not be considered in cases in which the employer has
violated any safety statute. Id. § 53. The FELA further stipulates that an employee
will not be held to have assumed the risks of employment where an injury or death
results from the negligence of any officer, agent, or employee of the carrier. Id.
§ 54. The FELA's statute of limitations expires three years after the date the cause
of action arises. Id. § 56. In addition, a cause of action under the FELA will accrue
to a deceased employee's personal representative. Id. § 59.
Judicial decisions involving the recovery of punitive damages under the FELA
are not in total harmony. Compare Gulf, Colo. & S. F. Ry. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173
(1913) (only individuals who actually sustain some pecuniary loss may recover
under FELA) and Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913) (damages
limited to loss of pecuniary benefits) and Kozar v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 449 F.2d
1238 (6th Cir. 1971) (punitive damages not recoverable) with Ennis v. Yazoo &
M.V.R. Co., 118 Miss. 509, 79 So. 73 (1918) (punitive damages may be allowed
where railroad shop employee was electrocuted and circumstances indicated dangerous condition had been reported).
6 See 1B BENEDICT, supra note 2, § 32, at 3-276 to -77. Admiralty law also implies a contractual obligation by shipowners to provide injured seamen with "maintenance and cure." See 2 M. NORRIS, supra note 1, §§ 26:1-:2. The United States
Supreme Court has noted that "[m]aintenance and cure is designed to provide a
seaman with food and lodging when he becomes sick or injured in the ship's service; and it extends during the period when he is incapacitated to do a seaman's
work and continues until he reaches maximum medical recovery." Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962). The ancient duty of a shipowner to provide main-,
tenance and cure was designed to alleviate the hardship of putting an injured
seaman ashore in a foreign country without financial resources. Id. at 535 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). See generally 2 M. NORRIS, supra note 1, §§ 26:1 -:74. In addition, a
seaman may recover lost wages in the amount of the salary he would have earned
had he completed either the particular voyage or the contractual terms of his employment. See lB BENEDICT, supra note 2, § 52, at 4-83; 2 M. NORRIS, supra note 1,
§ 26:7.
7 Compare IB BENEDICT, supra note 2, § 32, at 3-278 ("the law does not authorize punitive damages") with 2 M. NORRIS, supra note 1, § 30:41, at 517 ("the trend
in admiralty cases is toward the granting of punitive damages where the 'defendant's actions were so wanton and reckless as to evince a conscious disregard of the
rights of others' "). The courts have failed to resolve conclusively whether the
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In Kopczynski v. TheJacqueline,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit perpetuated this uncertainty by overturning a district court award of $325,000 in punitive damages
and holding that the Jones Act limits recoverable damages to pecuniary losses. 9 Reasoning that punitive damages are nonpecuniary, the court refused to award them in connection with a Jones
Act claim.' 0 The Ninth Circuit has thus strictly limited the
amount that may be recovered under the Jones Act, contravening
the intent of Congress to provide liberal recovery for injured
maritime workers."
The incident that gave rise to the Kopczynski case occurred on
August 25, 1981.2 The plaintiff, Gary Kopczynski, was participating in the refueling of theJacqueline.'3 This process included
emptying a number of fifty-five-gallon drums of fuel and hydraulic oil into the ship's tanks."' The empty drums were then manually removed from the deck of the ship to the dock.' 5 Kopczynski
was standing on the ship's safety rail for the purpose of either
Jones Act permits recovery of only pecuniary damages or whether punitive damages are also recoverable. See, e.g., Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, 606 F.2d 524 (5th
Cir. 1979) (majority holding Jones Act does not permit damages for loss of society
in wrongful death action; minority approving both pecuniary and nonpecuniary
damages); Baptiste v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 87, 164 Cal. Rptr. 789
(1980) (majority permitting plaintiff's punitive damage claim to go to jury; minority
limiting award to compensatory losses).
8 742 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984).
9 Id. at 560-61.
10 Id. at 561.
11 See, e.g., Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958) (intent
of Congress was to afford liberal recovery to injured seamen and railroad workers
and to expand remedy to meet changing concepts and conditions); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 375 (1932) (Jones Act should be liberally construed in order to advance its objective of protecting seamen and their
dependents).
12 Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 557.
13 Id.
14 Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline, 742 F.2d 555
(9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Opening Brief]. The vessel was
moored to the Shell Oil Company's fuel dock in the San Diego harbor. Id. The
ship's owner, Seaward Marine Services, employed Kopczynski as a diver/tender. Id.
at 2. His duties included cleaning the vessel, underwater photography of ships'
hulls, maintenance, monitoring of on-board machinery, and occasional navigation
and piloting. Id. at 2-3.
15 Id. at 3. The crew was performing the removal operation on the vessel's aftwork deck, which was six to eight feet below the dock because of the low tide. Id. at
4. The deck had become slippery as a result of oil spilled from several hydraulic
machines located on the ship. Id. at 5. Seaward Marine Services designed, owned,
and operated these machines in connection with its hull-cleaning operations. Id.
Kopczynski claimed that the oil buildup had caused every crew member to slip or
fall on several prior occasions. Id.
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unloading a drum or climbing up on the dock when he slipped
and fell, injuring his back.' 6
This method of using the ship's safety rail to pass empty
drums manually from the vessel's aft deck to the dock was customary practice.17 Although the forward deck of theJacquelinewas
higher off the water than the aft deck and thus closer to dock
level,' 8 the crew unloaded drums from the aft deck because the
passageway between the fore and aft decks was too narrow to
permit the carrying of empty drums to the forward deck. 19 In addition, there were no gangways, 20 straight ladders, orJacob's lad22
ders 21 on either deck to provide any other access to the dock.
As a result, the crew customarily used the safety railing to gain
access to the dock.2 3
During the ten months after his accident, Kopczynski received more than $17,000 in longshoreman's benefits. 24 When it
was later determined that he was a seaman and not a harbor
worker, his benefits under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act 25 were discontinued. 26 As a result,

Kopczynski filed an admiralty action in February of 1982 against
the shipowner, Seaward Marine Services, Inc. (Seaward). 27 Kopczynski alleged negligence and unseaworthiness. 28 He sought re16 Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 557.
17 Id.

18 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 4.
19 Id. at 4-5.
20 A gangway (or gangplank) is an opening for the loading and unloading of
passengers or cargo on a ship. WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 574 (2d ed. 1980).
21 AJacob's ladder is a rope or wire ladder that is commonly used on ships. Id. at
752.
22 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 5.
23 Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 557.
24 Id.
25 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982).
26 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 26. In May of 1982, the defend-

ants received notice from a United States Department of Labor claims examiner
that Kopczynski was a seaman and not a longshoreman. Id. The Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act specifically exempts the master or a member of a ship's crew from coverage. See 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)(1) (1982).
27 Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 557.
28 Id. Courts have continually expanded the definition of an unseaworthy vessel.
See generally 1B BENEDICT, supra note 2, §§ 23-24 (collecting and analyzing cases). In
general, however, a vessel is unseaworthy if it is unable to withstand an ordinary sea
voyage. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Compania de Navegacion, Interior, S.A., 19
F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1927). If unseaworthiness is the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs injury, the defendant shipowner is liable. See Provenza v. American Ex-
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covery of compensatory damages, maintenance and cure, 29 and
punitive damages.3 1 In July, the jury, in response to special interrogatories, found Seaward negligent, but rejected Kopczynski's
claim that the Jacqueline was unseaworthy. 3 ' Kopczynski was
awarded $450,000 in compensatory damages,
$55,301 for
maintenance and cure, and $325,000 in punitive damages.3 3 The
jury based its punitive damage award upon a finding
that the de3 s4
fendant "had acted wantonly and maliciously."

Seaward appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the
Jones Act precludes recovery for punitive damages. 35 Kopczynski
cross-appealed the issues of his comparative negligence, the vessel's unseaworthiness, and the amount of his maintenance and
port Lines, 324 F.2d 660, 662-63 (4th Cir. 1963). Therefore, the obligation of a
shipowner to furnish a seaworthy ship is absolute. Id.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S.
96 (1944), the seaworthiness concept has provided seamen with a theory of recovery separate from negligence principles. See lB BENEDICT, supra note 2, § 23, at 317 to -19. In the flood of maritime personal injury cases since the 1950's, unseaworthiness has been the catalyst for recovery. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 1,
at 279. In contrast to negligence, which requires the plaintiff to prove the shipowner's knowledge of a dangerous condition, a vessel's unseaworthiness is established without regard to fault. lB BENEDICT, supra note 2, § 21, at 3-3. Thus, if the
seaman can prove that the vessel was unseaworthy, proof of negligence is unnecessary. Id.
If the vessel is determined to be unseaworthy, damages under either the unseaworthiness doctrine or the Jones Act and maintenance and cure are recoverable. See
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 1, at 383. These actions are termed the
"Siamese twins" because it is sometimes unclear whether a particular action is
properly in one category or the other. See id. The distinction between unseaworthiness and negligence, however, remains significant. If a vessel is determined to be
seaworthy, but the shipowner is found negligent, the finding of seaworthiness can
usually be attacked on grounds of inconsistency. lB BENEDICT, supra note 2, § 23, at
3-57 to -58; see, e.g., infra note 117 (plaintiff in Kopczynski attacked finding of seaworthiness after jury decided that shipowner was negligent).
29 See supra note 6.
30 See Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 557.
31 Id. On appeal, Kopczynski argued that the district court should have directed
a verdict on the issue of unseaworthiness. See Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note
14, at 24-25. Kopczynski also contended that the jury instructions were inadequate
and that the court improperly excluded evidence on this issue. Id. at 18-24; see infra
note 117 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's disposition of these claims).
32 Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 557. The jury originally awarded $692,308 in compensatory damages. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 1. This amount was
reduced by 35% to $450,000 because of Kopczynski's contributory negligence. Id.
at 2.
33 Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 557.
34

Id.

Id. See Answering Brief as Appellee and Opening Brief as Cross-Appellant at
26-43, Kopczynski v. TheJacqueline, 742 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984).
35
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cure award.3 6 A three-judge panel affirmed the district court's
findings as to negligence, maintenance and cure, and unseaworthiness, but reversed on the issue of punitive damages. 37 Reasoning that the Jones Act limits damage awards to pecuniary losses,
the Ninth Circuit concluded
that punitive damages are not recov38
erable under the Act.

For hundreds of years, the ancient maritime codes provided

39
for redress to sailors injured while in the service of the ship.

The Rules of Oleron,4 ° for example, stated that a mariner who
was wounded or hurt as a result of a master's order "shall be
cured and provided for at the costs and charges of the said
ship."'" The shipowner's traditional duty to pay maintenance and
cure and lost wages to an injured sailor evolved from these ancient codes.4 2 In this country, one of the earliest Supreme Court
decisions to address the issue of a seaman's right to recover damages for personal injury was The Osceola.43 In that case, a seaman
was injured when a derrick supporting the forward port gangway
fell on him. 4 4 The master had ordered the gangway raised

although the vessel was still three miles from port and facing
strong winds. 45 Writing for the Court, Justice Brown acknowl36 Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 557. Kopczynski maintained that his compensatory
damage award should not have been decreased by his contributory negligence, that
as a matter of law the Jacqueline should have been found unseaworthy, and that he
should have been awarded attorneys' fees as part of his maintenance and cure. Id.
37 Id.

38 Id. at 560-61.
39 See generally lB BENEDICT, supra note 2, § 41, at 4-2 to -4.
40 The Rules (Laws) of Oleron, a twelfth century code of maritime laws, were
promulgated at the island of Oleron by Eleanor of Guienne. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 979 (5th ed. 1979). The Rules were later adopted in England. Id.; see also 2 M.
NORRIS, supra note 1, § 26:3, at 5 n.6 (setting forth history of Rules).
41 1B BENEDICT, supra note 2, § 41, at 4-2.
42 See supra note 6 (definitions of maintenance and cure and lost wages).
43 189 U.S. 158 (1903). While earlier cases permitted awards of punitive damages in admiralty, these decisions did not involve claims for physical injuries. The
earliest case cited as approving an award of punitive damages in admiralty is The
Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818). That case involved the robbery and
plunder of a Haitian schooner by the Scourge, an American privateer. Id. at 546-47.
In an opinion written by Justice Story, the Supreme Court held that if the action
had been brought against the actual wrongdoers instead of the Scourge's owners,
exemplary damages could have been assessed to punish the lawless misconduct. Id.
at 558. Later, in Gallagher v. The Yankee, 9 F. Cas. 1091 (N.D. Cal.) (No. 5196),
afd, 30 F. Cas. 781 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 18,124), a district court awarded
exemplary damages to an individual who had been abducted and transported to the
Hawaiian Islands. Id. at 1091, 1093. The court concluded that such a flagrant violation of personal liberties justified the award. Id. at 1093.
44 The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 159.
45 Id.
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edged that a vessel owner was liable to an injured seaman for
maintenance and cure and lost wages resulting from a mishap
caused by an unseaworthy condition of the ship.4 6 He concluded,
however, that a seaman was not entitled to damages for injuries
resulting from negligence or accident.4 7 The Court reasoned that
the wind, rather than the ship, had caused the damage to the in48
jured seaman.
In response to the Osceola decision,49 Congress passed the
Jones Act 5" in 1920, which provided an injured seaman with both
the right to maintain an action 5 ' at law for damages and the right
to a jury trial.5 2 The drafters of the statute, however, defined
neither the scope of an injured seaman's cause of action nor the
types of damages that may be recovered under the Act. 53 Resolution of these issues was left to the courts. 5 4
46 Id. at 175. In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the Court recognized the following propositions of admiralty law:
1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls
sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long as the voyage is
continued.
2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and
keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship....
3. That all the members of the crew, except perhaps the master,
are, as between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot
recover for injuries sustained through the negligence of another member of the crew beyond the expense of their maintenance and cure.
4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the
negligence of the master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to
maintenance and cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence
or accident.
Id. (citation omitted).
4 7 Id.

Id. at 177.
See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 1, at 277.
50 See supra note 1 (setting forth text of Jones Act).
51 The injured seaman may elect either a civil action or a suit in admiralty. See lB
BENEDICT, supra note 2, § 2, at 1-12. If he chooses to sue in admiralty, however, he
forfeits his right to a jury trial. Id.
52 See supra note I (setting forth text of Jones Act).
53 See id.
54 See, e.g., Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955) (Jones Act cause of action survives
death of tortfeasor); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939) (assumption of risk does not bar recovery under Jones Act, but operates to reduce
recoverable damages); Plamals v. The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928) (injured
seaman cannot proceed in rem against vessel); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S.
375 (1924) (Jones Act held constitutional).
48

49
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In 1962, the Supreme Court in Vaughan v. Atkinson 55 first
provided for recovery of damages outside of the traditional payments for maintenance and cure and lost wages. In that case, a
seaman contracted tuberculosis while in the service of the defendant's vessel.5 6 For two years, the shipowner failed to investigate the seaman's claim for maintenance and cure.5 7 Having
received no compensation from the shipowner during the twoyear period in which he was unfit to work as a seaman, the plaintiff filed suit, seeking maintenance and cure as well as damages
resulting from the failure to pay maintenance and cure.58 The
district court awarded the plaintiff maintenance and cure, but rejected his claim for attorneys' fees incurred as a result of the defendant's refusal to make the required payments.5 9 The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.60
Reversing both lower courts, the Supreme Court awarded
the seaman attorneys' fees as the measure of his consequential
damages for the defendant's failure to pay maintenance and
cure. 6 1 In justifying this award, the Court found that the defendant's conduct in failing to provide maintenance and cure for
nearly two years was "willful and persistent. ' 62 In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Stewart agreed with the majority's conclusion
that a seaman may be entitled to damages for failure to pay maintenance and cure.6 3 He emphasized, however, that if the failure
to pay maintenance and cure were intentional and wanton, then
the seaman should be entitled to exemplary damages in accord55 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
56

Id. at 528.

57 Id. at 528-29.
58 Id. at 529.

59 Id. The district court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he had
suffered any damages as a result of the defendant's failure to pay maintenance and
cure. Id. The court recognized, however, that such damages would be available
"when the failure to furnish maintenance and cure caused or aggravated the illness
or other physical or mental suffering." Id.
60 Vaughan v. Atkinson, 291 F.2d 813, 815 (4th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 527
(1962). Reasoning that the plaintiffs claim was essentially a breach of contract,
which did not give rise to the type of consequential damages claimed, the court of
appeals affirmed the district court. Id. at 815.
61 Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 531 & n.3.
62 Id. at 531. Although the majority awarded the plaintiff damages, it was unclear
whether the award was wholly compensatory or whether a separate award for punitive damages was granted. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 1, at 313.
63 Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 539-40 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, he rejected
the majority's determination that a failure to pay maintenance and cure resulted in
an automatic right to counsel fees. Id.
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ance with traditional damage concepts.64
The Vaughan decision generated a great deal of conflict in
the lower courts.6 5 For example, in Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc.,66
the First Circuit affirmed the plaintiff's maintenance and cure
award of $21,366.06, which included $10,000 in punitive damages.6 7 In that case, the plaintiff injured his back when he fell on
the defendant's fishing vessel. 68 The defendant subsequently refused to send Robinson his maintenance payments regularly.69
Stressing Justice Stewart's Vaughan dissent, the court found that
the defendant's callous conduct justified the submission of the
punitive damage charge to the jury.7 °
The Second Circuit, in contrast, has interpreted Vaughan as
authorizing only attorneys' fees as punitive damages. 7 ' Following
72
the Vaughan majority, the court in Kraljic v. Berman Enterprises
affirmed a $300 award for attorneys' fees, but reversed the $3000
punitive damage judgment.73 Arguing that a seaman is prohibited from enjoying a redundant damage award, 4 the Kraljic court
read Vaughan as permitting only counsel fees as punitive damages
75
when the failure to provide maintenance and cure is willful.

64 Id. at 540 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart stated that the amount of
punitive damages awarded should be determined by the trier of fact and should be
calculated by considering all of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's failure to pay maintenance and cure. Id. He would have remanded the case to the
district court for an examination of the events that prompted the defendant's failure to make the required payments. Id.
65 See 2 M. NORRIS, supra note 1, § 26:41, at 110-17.
66 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir. 1973).
67 Id. at 1049, 1053.
68 Id. at 1049.
69 Id. at 1050. The shipowner initially charged that Robinson had venereal disease and was fired for cause. Id. When this allegation was disproved, the defendant
persisted in failing to make regular maintenance payments despite the fact that
Robinson notified him that his mortgage was about to be foreclosed. Id. Ultimately,
Robinson lost his home, and when he refused to accept what he believed was an
inadequate settlement, all payments were terminated. Id. Robinson subsequently
brought suit against the defendant. Id. at 1049.
70 Id. at 1051-52.
71 See Kraljic v. Berman Enters., 575 F.2d 412, 415-16 (2d Cir. 1978); 2 M. NORRIS, supra note 1, § 26:41, at 112-13.
72 575 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978).
73 Id. at 416.
74 Id. at 414. The court defined the issue as whether an award of punitive damages in a suit for maintenance and cure should be limited to attorneys' fees alone or
whether the amount should be left to the jury's discretion. Id. The court reasoned
that an award based on both damage theories was without precedent. Id.
75 Id. at 414-16. Although the Kraljic court recognized that the Robinson opinion
awarded punitive damages without limiting them to counsel fees, the Kraljic court
refused to follow Robinson because that decision relied on Justice Stewart's Vaughan
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Most recently, in Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 7 6 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a shipowner's arbitrary refusal
to pay maintenance and cure justifies an award of attorneys' fees
as well as general damages under the Jones Act.7 7 In addition,
the court held that punitive damages for failure to pay maintenance and cure are recoverable under the general maritime law.7 8
In Holmes, the plaintiff was injured while working on the defendant's barge. 79 The defendant initially terminated the plaintiffs
maintenance and cure payments after several doctors determined
that Holmes had suffered no injury.80 When Holmes was later
diagnosed as having a herniated lumbar disc, the defendant refused to reinstate the plaintiff's maintenance and cure payments.8 1 The jury found that McDermott's failure to reinstate
the maintenance and cure payments was willful and arbitrary and
therefore awarded the plaintiff $11,550 as punitive damages.8 2
dissent rather than on the majority opinion. Id. at 415. The Kraljic court further
reasoned that the Vaughan majority had limited the plaintiff's punitive damage recovery to counsel fees. Id. at 416. The court noted that to allow a seaman to recover
separate awards of counsel fees and exemplary damages would constitute a double
recovery. Id. at 414.
76 734 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1984).
77 Id. at 1120-21.
78 Id. at 1118. For support, the Holmes court cited In re Merry Shipping, Inc., 650
F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1981). Holmes, 734 F.2d at 1118. In Merry Shipping, the wife of a
seaman who had drowned sought damages under the general maritime law and the
Jones Act for her husband's pain and suffering and for her pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses. Merry Shipping, 650 F.2d at 623. The plaintiff also pleaded for punitive
damages. Id. The court recognized the distinction that had developed regarding
damages recoverable under the general maritime law and the Jones Act. Id. at 624.
Under both theories of recovery, the court noted, the survivors may recover for
their own losses and for the deceased seaman's pain and suffering and personal
losses. Id. Under the Jones Act, however, the court acknowledged that only pecuniary losses were recoverable by the seaman's survivors. Id.
Applying this distinction, the Merry Shipping court held that if punitive damages
are not recoverable under the Jones Act, they must be recoverable under the general maritime law upon proof of a shipowner's willful and wanton misconduct in
creating or maintaining an unseaworthy vessel. Id. at 625; see supra note 28 (discussing the concept of unseaworthiness). The court found three justifications for its
ruling. First, the general maritime law is fashioned by judicial decision making and
is not constrained by statute. Merry Shipping, 650 F.2d at 626. Second, the general
maritime law permits recovery of nonpecuniary losses. Id. Third, proof of willful
and wanton misconduct is required to justify a punitive damage award. Id. Finally,
the court rejected the defendant's argument that a punitive damage award under
the general maritime law was barred because the suit was brought together with a
Jones Act claim. Id. at 626-27.
79 Holmes, 734 F.2d at 1112.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1113.
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed this award.8 3
While these cases established that damages are available
under the Jones Act for a shipowner's refusal to pay maintenance
and cure, they did not determine whether punitive damages are
generally available under the Jones Act in negligence actions. In
United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 4 however, the Sixth Circuit
considered the issue of whether a plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages for a shipowner's negligent approval of its captain's
actions.8 5 In that case, the master of the Cedarville ordered the
ship beached rather than abandoned after a collision.8 6 During
the attempted beaching, the vessel capsized and ten crewmen
drowned.8 7 The district court held that punitive damages were
recoverable under the Jones Act in instances in which an injury
was the proximate result of a shipowner's approval of a captain's
foolhardy conduct.88 The court of appeals reversed, finding that
the shipowner had not authorized or ratified the captain's actions. 89 The Fuhrman court noted, however, that punitive damages may be recoverable "if the acts complained of were those of
an unfit master and the owner was reckless in employing him." 90
In an analogous case involving a railroad worker, the Sixth
Circuit again found it necessary to reverse a punitive damage
award granted by the district court. 9 ' In Kozar v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Railway,9 2 the decedent railroad employee was crushed to
death by a refrigerator car when the brake system of the crane
that was suspending the car malfunctioned.9 3 In a comprehensive
opinion, the district court concluded that the legislative history
of the FELA 9' permitted the plaintiff to recover punitive damages upon a showing that the defendant "acted wilfully [sic],
83 See id. at 1119. The court approved the punitive damage award, recognizing
that it served as both a deterrent and a punishment. Id. at 1118.
84 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
85 Id. at 1144, 1148.
86 Id. at 1145.
87 Id.
88 In re Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 276 F. Supp. 163, 198-99 (N.D. Ohio
1967), rev'd sub nom. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir.
1969), cert denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
89 See Fuhrman, 407 F.2d at 1148.
90 Id. The court also accepted the rationale that punitive damages are recoverable when an owner authorizes or ratifies a master's acts prior to or immediately
after an accident. See id.
91 See Kozar v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 449 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1971).
92 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971).
93 Kozar v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335, 342-43 (W.D. Mich. 1970),
vacated in part, 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971).
94 See supra note 5 (outlining provisions of FELA).
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wantonly, or with reckless disregard for the safety of John Kozar." 9 5 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated the punitive damage
award. 9 6 The court agreed that the legislative history of the FELA
indicated that Congress did not intend to restrict the remedies
available to railroad workers who were injured or killed, but concluded that Congress did not intend "damages" to be synonymous with "remedy." 9' 7 Furthermore, the court noted that the
absence of any reported punitive damage awards since the
FELA's 1908 enactment indicated that punitive damages should
98
not be allowed under the Act.
There is a clear split of authority, however, respecting the
issue of whether the provisions of the FELA are applicable to
Jones Act cases. 99 For example, in Baptiste v. Superior Court,10 0 a
seaman sued his employer under the Jones Act and the general
maritime law.' 0 ' The plaintiff charged that the defendant had
specific knowledge of dangerously high noise levels in the ship's
engine rooms, which caused the plaintiff to suffer a loss of hearing.'" 2 Subsequently, the plaintiff amended his complaint to include a punitive damage claim because of the defendant's
egregious disregard for his safety. 10 3 The trial court granted the
defendant's application to strike the punitive damage claim, and
the plaintiff appealed. 0 4
The appellate court unequivocally held that the plaintiff
could present his punitive damage claim to the jury. 0 5 The court
95 Kozar v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335, 357 (W.D. Mich. 1970),
vacated in part, 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971). The court observed that the Senate
Report to the 1910 FELA amendments indicated that Congress did not intend to
limit the pre-existing rights and remedies to which railroad employees were then
entitled. Id. at 350. In addition, the district court failed to perceive why Congress
would have intended the FELA to eliminate the common law remedy of punitive
damages when the express purpose of the Act was to impose "stringent liabilities
upon the railroads for injuries to their employees." Id. at 355.
96 Kozar, 449 F.2d at 1243.
97 Id. at 1240.
98 Id. at 1243.
99 Compare Note, Punitive Damages in Maritime PersonalInjuries: Dyer v. Merry Shipping Co., 43 LA. L. REV. 823, 831-32 (1983) (courts apply FELA to Jones Act cases
only when it serves policies of maritime law) with Dahlquist, Punitive Damages Under
the Jones Act, 6 MAR. LAw. 1, 31 (1981) (Supreme Court's interpretations of FELA
preclude punitive damages under Jones Act).
100 106 Cal. App. 3d 87, 164 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980).
101 Id. at 91, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
102 Id. at 92, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
103 Id. at 92-93, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
104 Id. at 93, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 791-92.
105 Id. at 104, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
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noted that punitive damages are an integral part of Federal common law as well as admiralty law.' 0 6 The court could find no
Supreme Court case precluding a punitive damage award under
Federal common law. 107 In addition, the Baptiste court observed
that although many courts accepted punitive damage awards in
principle, they denied the award on the narrow basis of the particular facts presented. 0 8 The court in Baptiste acknowledged the
Kozar decision, but concluded that case law construing the FELA
was neither persuasive nor controlling authority in Jones Act
litigation.'09

The Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result three years later,
however, in Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. "' That case involved the drowning of a seaman in the Bering Sea."' The court
ruled that damages under the Jones Act were expressly governed
by cases construing the FELA.'' 2 Thus, because those cases 113
limited damages to nonpecuniary losses, the Ninth Circuit found
that loss of society, a nonpecuniary loss, was not compensable
under the Jones Act.' The Nygaard court, however, expressed
no opinion on the issue of whether punitive damages could be
recovered under the Jones Act."15
The Kopczynski case squarely presented this issue to the
Id. at 96-97, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
Id. at 96, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
108 See id. at 102, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
109 Id. at 102-03, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
110 701 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1983).
II Id. at 78. The plaintiff, the deceased seaman's administratrix, instituted suit
under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), the Jones Act, and the general
maritime law. Id. The district court found the decedent's employer liable, but limited the damage recovery to the decedent's pain and suffering and his son's loss of
monetary support. Id. at 79. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the orphaned
son's loss of society and loss of nurture were compensable and that the denial of
loss of inheritance damages was improper. Id.
112 Id. The Nygaard court made no reference to the Baptiste case. See id. at 78-8 1;
see also supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text (discussing Baptiste).
113 See supra note 5 (discussing nonpecuniary damages under FELA).
114 Nygaard, 701 F.2d at 79. Although the Nygaard court found that loss of society
was a nonpecuniary loss and therefore could not be recovered under the Jones Act
or the DOHSA, it held that loss of nurture was compensable under the DOHSA. Id.
at 81. Thus, the court remanded the case to the district court for a consideration of
whether the decedent's son was entitled to damages for loss of nurture. Id.
115 See id. at 79-80. Although the issue of punitive damages was not addressed in
the Nygaard decision, the Kopczynski court relied on Nygaard to support its conclusion that only pecuniary losses are recoverable under the Jones Act. Kopczynski, 742
F.2d at 560-61. For a criticism of the decision in Nygaard, see Tallentire v. Offshore
Logistics, Inc., 754 F.2d 1274, 1283 (5th Cir. 1985).
106
107
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1 17
Ninth Circuit."' 6 After disposing of several subsidiary issues,
the court began its analysis of the punitive damages question by
noting that the issue was a novel one in its circuit." 8 Relying on
prior law, the court reasoned that the Jones Act incorporates the
FELA" 9' and that case law interpreting the FELA supports only
compensatory awards. 120 Accordingly, the Kopczynski court held

See Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 560.
See id. at 557-60. Kopczynski appealed the reduction of his compensatory
award by the amount of his contributory negligence, arguing that Seaward had violated several safety regulations. Id. at 557-58. Because the Ninth Circuit determined
that the safety statutes alleged to have been violated did not apply to Kopczynski,
the court refused to decide whether § 53 of the FELA, incorporated by reference
into the Jones Act, would obviate consideration of a seaman's contributory negligence when a safety regulation had been violated. Id. at 558.
Section 53 of the FELA specifically provides that if an employer contributes to
an injury or causes death by violating a safety statute, the plaintiffs contributory
negligence will not reduce the amount of recovery. See supra note 5; see also Kernan
v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958) (employer liable for death of seaman resulting from violation of regulation requiring kerosene lamps on scows to be
kept at least eight feet above water). The Kopczynski court, however, affirmed the
district court's conclusion that the safety regulations at issue applied only to longshoremen and harbor workers. Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 558. Finding that Kopczynski
was a seaman, the court decided that these regulations did not apply to him. Id. at
559. Therefore, Kopczynski's contributory negligence could operate to reduce the
amount of his damages. Id. at 558-59.
Kopczynski also appealed the jury's finding that the Jacqueline was seaworthy.
Id. at 559-60. The plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the
jury regarding the violation of safety statutes and regulations. Appellant's Opening
Brief, supra note 14, at 22. He maintained that a proper instruction would have
caused the jury to find theJacquelineunseaworthy. Id. The circuit court rejected this
claim, stating that the trial judge had acted properly in excluding the inapplicable
regulations from the jury's consideration. See Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 560.
Finally, Kopczynski contested the amount of his maintenance and cure award.
Id. at 559. He claimed that counsel fees should have been included in the award. Id.
The Ninth Circuit approved the line of cases construing the Supreme Court's
Vaughan decision as allowing counsel fees only in the face of a shipowner's arbitrary, recalcitrant, or unreasonable failure to provide maintenance and cure. Id. In
its answer to a special interrogatory, thejury had found that Seaward was not willful
or arbitrary in failing to pay Kopczynski's maintenance and cure. Id. In view of Kopczynski's questionable status (longshoreman or seaman), the court maintained that
the jury's conclusion was not unreasonable. Id. Therefore, Kopczynski was not entitled to attorneys' fees. Id.
118 Id. at 560. The court addressed only the issue of punitive damages in a Jones
Act negligence case. See id. Because the jury found the Jacqueline seaworthy, the
Ninth Circuit refused to decide whether a finding of unseaworthiness would support a punitive damage award. Id.; see also supra note 28 (noting distinction between
negligence theory and unseaworthiness doctrine).
119 Id.
120 Id. In support of its argument, the court cited both Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v.
McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173 (1913) and Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59
(1913). In neither of these cases was the issue of punitive damages specifically addressed. See supra note 5. Both decisions emphasized that recovery by a decedent's
116
117
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that damages under the Jones Act should be limited to recovery
of pecuniary losses. 12 1 The court then summarily concluded that
punitive damages could not be granted in a Jones Act negligence
suit because they are nonpecuniary in nature. 122 Finally, the court
suggested 2that
any reconsideration of its holding be left to
3
Congress.

The court in Kopczynski found support for its holding in an
article written by Robert Dahlquist. 124 The article concludes that
punitive damages should not be recoverable in a Jones Act
case.' 25 The author argues that a presumption exists that the
Jones Act precludes recovery for punitive damages because the
Act does not contain an express statement authorizing such an
award. 126 Further, Dahlquist adopts the reasoning that FEIA
cases "must be controlling on the Jones Act."'' 27 Dahlquist notes
that the FELA cases were decided before Congress passed the
Jones Act and that Congress is presumed to have known that
these cases limited recovery to compensatory damages.12 8 Consequently, Dahlquist argues that by incorporating the FELA into
the Jones Act, Congress prohibited a seaman from
recovering
12
punitive damages for employment-related injuries. 9
beneficiary for grief, sorrow, or loss of society is precluded. See McGinnis, 228 U.S.
at 175-76; Vreeland, 227 U.S. at 72-74. More recent Supreme Court decisions have
altered this position. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974)
(longshoreman's representative entitled to recover damages for loss of support and
services, funeral expenses, and loss of society). But see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 623 (1978) (Death on the High Seas Act limits survivor's
recovery to pecuniary losses); DoCarmo v. F.V. Pilgrim I. Corp., 612 F.2d 11 (1st
Cir. 1979) (survivor's recovery for wrongful death underJones Act limited to pecuniary losses).
121 Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 560-61.
122 Id. at 561.
123 Id.
124 See id. (citing Dahlquist, supra note 99). The court deemed the Dahlquist article "persuasive." Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 561.
125 Dahlquist, supra note 99, at 36.
126 Id. at 27-28.
127 Id. at 36.
128 Id. at 28.
129 Id. Dahlquist also asserts that the Jones Act is clearly analogous to state
wrongful death statutes. Id. at 33-34. Further, he writes that because punitive damages are generally denied under those statutes, they similarly should be disallowed
under the Jones Act. Id. at 35. This conclusion conveniently ignores wrongful death
statutes in several states that expressly or impliedly permit punitive damage awards.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.130 (Cum. Supp. 1984);
MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (West 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Cum.
Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976); VA. CODE § 8.01-52
(1984). See generally Note, Punitive Damages in Admiralty, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 995, 100405 (1967). Furthermore, reliance on state wrongful death statutes for a complete
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Dahlquist's (and by implication the Kopczynski court's) argument that the Jones Act does not permit recovery of punitive
damages absent an express statement is unconvincing. An
equally strong argument may be presented that punitive damages
are recoverable under the Jones Act unless the language of the
statute clearly prohibits such an award. 30 The conclusion that
punitive damages are not recoverable under the Jones Act because decisions involving the FELA do not provide for their recovery is also untenable. Neither of the two decisions relied on to
support this proposition addressed the issue of punitive damages. 13 1 In neither case did the plaintiff plead punitive damages. 132 Rather, both cases determined only the type of
compensatory3 3 damages to which the particular plaintiff properly
was entitled.1

Furthermore, Dahlquist impliedly asserts that punitive damages should be denied in Jones Act cases because seamen are
currently provided with an ample measure of diverse and duplicate reparations. I 34 This argument is disingenuous at best because it fails to recognize the purpose of a punitive damage
award. Admittedly, an exemplary award is noncompensatory. It
does not relate to any out-of-pocket loss, nor does it pretend to
equal lost earnings, loss of society, or the like. It does, however,
35
serve to punish the defendant and to deter similar conduct.
Punitive damages are generally recoverable in tort actions in
which the defendant has been found to have disregarded the
plaintiff's rights willfully, wantonly, recklessly, maliciously, or
prohibition of punitive damages under the Jones Act disregards the fact that the
Jones Act is not solely a wrongful death statute; it also provides a cause of action for
personal injury. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
130 Unlike the Jones Act, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), for example,
specifies that recovery under the Act "shall be a fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought." 46
U.S.C. § 762 (1982) (emphasis added). Both the DOHSA and the Jones Act were
enacted in the same year. See supra note 1. Therefore, Congress, by choosing not to
adopt language limitingJones Act damages to pecuniary losses, clearly could have
intended the Jones Act to allow a wider variety of awards. Cf. Dahlquist, supra note
99, at 23-25 (recognizing that the language chosen by Congress permits multiple
interpretations),
131 See Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173 (1913); Michigan Cent.
R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913).
132 See Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173, 173-74 (1913); Michigan
Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 65 (1913).
133 See supra notes 5 & 120.
134 Dahlquist, supra note 99, at 13.
135 D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 204 (1973).
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In cases in which a shipowner's actions are in flagrant

violation of a seaman's rights, it is inequitable to foreclose recovery of a punitive damage award when the circumstances warrant
deterrence. In addition, one court has suggested that punitive
damage awards be placed into a fund to support the general class
of seamen rather than to enrich individual plaintiffs. 137 Such a
policy would serve both the punitive and deterrent purposes of
exemplary damages without providing an individual plaintiff with
a windfall recovery.
Finally, recognition of a right to punitive damages in Jones
Act negligence cases will eliminate much of the confusion surrounding this important issue in maritime personal injury litigation. Several courts have determined that an injured seaman may
recover punitive damages when the trier of fact finds that the vessel was unseaworthy.138 Indeed, the Kopczynski court, while precluding recovery of punitive damages in a negligence action,
expressly left open the possibility of exemplary damages in a case
of unseaworthiness.139 Thus, a future Ninth Circuit plaintiff can
seek punitive damages if he establishes unseaworthiness, but not
if he only proves negligence.
This distinction between negligence actions and unseaworthiness is unwarranted. A finding of seaworthiness means only
that the vessel is fit for an ordinary sea voyage. 4 As the Kopczynski facts demonstrate, a seaworthy ship can be just as dangerous
as an unseaworthy craft.' 4 ' Therefore, the focus should be on the
nature of the shipowner's disregard for his employee's safety
rather than on the seaman's theory of liability. Such an emphasis
on the owner's acts and omissions will encourage uniform application of traditional exemplary damage principles to all cases of
maritime personal injury. At the same time, the threat of a punitive award will compel shipowners to keep their vessels in top
condition.
In conclusion, the subject of recovery of punitive damages
under the Jones Act is an area that cries out for immediate review. Legislative attention should be directed to the many inconsistencies and inequities that have arisen because of the
136

See id. at 204-05.

137 See Baptiste, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 95, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 793.

See In re Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1981); Baptiste
v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 87, 103, 164 Cal. Rptr. 789, 798 (1980).
139 See Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 560; see also supra note 118.
140 See supra note 28 (setting forth definition of unseaworthiness).
141 See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text (outlining facts of Kopczynski).
138
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imprecise language of the Jones Act. A resolution is urgently
needed to calm the churning waters involving punitive damages
in order to prevent future litigants and courts from foundering in
a sea of uncertainty.
Joanne M. Maxwell

